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A HEAT OF PASSION OFFENSE: 
EMOTIONS AND BIAS IN "TRANS PANIC" 
MITIGATION CLAIMS 
VICTORIA L. STEINBERG * 
HIDING FROM HUMANITY. By Martha C. Nussbaum. Princeton: 
Princeton University Press. 2004. Pp. 413. 
Abstract: In Hiding from Humanity: Disgust, Shamc, and thc Law, Martha C. 
Nussbaum critically examines the role of emotions in our legal system. 
Nussbaum combines insights from child psychology. history, sociology. 
and legal theory to determine whether shame and disgust are reliable 
foundations on which to base law. She concludes that these two emotions 
serve as repositories of unreasonableness, mediums for abuse of minor-
ities, and reflections of a society's current anxieties. Thus, they form a 
portrait of current prejudices and Yllinerabilities, and should not 
constitute the basis for mitigation. This Book Review applies Nussbaum's 
analysis to the case of Gwen AratDo, a transgendered woman killed by 
four of her friends. In that case, defendants attempted to mitigate the 
punishment for their brutal killing through a heat of passion argument 
called a "trans panic defense." An examination of the provocation, 
emotion. and reasonableness elements of a heat of passion claim reveals 
that trans panic defenses never justifY this type of mitigation. Nussbaum 
fails to address violence against transgendered individuals; however, her 
insights about emotion illustrate why courts should decline to instruct on 
manslaughter when defendants argue a trans panic defense. 
INTRODUCTION 
On the night of October 3, 2002, four young men found out that 
their friend, Gwen Aral~o, was biologically male. 1 They kneed her in 
* Staff Writer, BOSTON COLLEGE THIRD WORLD LAW JOURNAL (2004-2005). For their 
support and endless patience, I thank Gavi Wolfe, Shauna Shames, Claire Donohue, l\1at-
thew Brunell, Audrey Kwak, and my family. For their inspiration and their strength, I 
thank the many activists, lawyers, and victims' families who work for social justice for the 
trans community. 
1 Scc Datelillc NBC: Profile: Without Mcrcy; Thc Lifc and Dcath of Gwcn Eddic Araujo Jr., Vic-
tim of Transgcndcr Violcncc (NBC News television broadcast, Mar. 21, 2004), available at 2004 
vVL 65701394 [hereinafter Without Mcrcyl. Araujo began to reveal her identity as a woman 
in 1999 and asked others to call her Gwen, or sometimes Lida. See id. Her mother and 
family were supportive when she told them about her identity as female; she planned to 
499 
500 Boston College Third WoTld Law Journal [Vol. 25:499 
the face, slapped, kicked, and choked her, beat her with a can and a 
metal skillet, wrestled her to the ground, tied her wrists and ankles, 
strangled her with a rope, and hit her over the head with a shove1.2 
She begged for mercy, offered money in a desperate attempt to buy 
her freedom, and said her last words: "Please don't, I have a family. "3 
Her killers buried her in a shallow grave and went to McDonald's for 
breakfast.4 
One man pled guilty and testified against his friends. 5 Another 
disclaimed any role in Araujo's murder, asserting that he only helped 
to bury her.6 The remaining two defendants argued that if guilty, their 
crime was the lesser offense of manslaughter because they killed in a 
heat ofpassion.7 This attempt to mitigate their crime pointed a public 
have sex reassignment surgery someday. See id. After Araujo's death, her mother success-
fully petitioned the court to change her name from Eddie to Gwen Amber Rose Araujo, 
saying, "I made a promise to her and I fulfilled my promise. I only wish in my lifetime I 
had called her Gwen more often." See Ben Aguirre Jr., Slain Transgender Teen s Name Legally 
Changed to Gwen, OAKLAND TRIB., July 3,2004, available at 2004 WL 79863115. 
2 See Memorandum of Law from Michael P. Thorman to Alameda Super. Ct. in Sup-
port of Motion to Set Aside Hate Clause Allegation and Information Pursuant to Penal 
Code § 995, Points and Authorities in Support Thereof at 7-9, People v. Magidson, No. H-
33728C (Super. Ct. Cal. filed June 25, 2003) (on file with author) [hereinafter Hate Clause 
Memo]. This memorandum of law was filed on behalf of defendant Magidson; Michelle 
Locke, Transgender Murder Trial Seen as a Civil Rights Case, MONTEREY COUNTY HERALD, 
June 6, 2004 [hereinafter Locke, Transgender Murder]; Michelle Locke, Jury Ponders Case of 
Slain Transgellder Teen, CONTRA COSTA TIMES, June 4, 2004, at 4 [hereinafter Locke, Jury 
Ponders]; Michelle Locke, Defense Claims Amujo Slaying Was in Surprise, MONTEREY COUNTY 
HERALD,June 3,2004, [hereinafter Locke, Defense Claims]; Christopher Curtis, A.raujo Trial: 
Defense Confronts Key Witness, Apr. 28, 2004, PLANET OUT, at http://www.planetout.com/ 
news/article.html?2004/04/28/2. 
3 Ivan Delventhal, Witness Tells of Assault on Araujo, OAKLAND TRIB., Apr. 27, 2004; Yomi 
S. Wronge, Witness Says Victim Offered Cash to Suspect, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Mar. 18, 
2003, at 1. 
4 See Murder Trial Starts in Teen's Slaying, L.A. TIMES, Apr.15, 2002, at B8. The details are 
more gruesome than described here. See Hate Clause lHemo, supra note 2, at 5-8. After sus-
pecting for some time that Gwen may have male genitals, the young men harassed her at a 
friend's party and told a female friend to take Gwen into the bathroom to find out her 
biological sex. See id. After the men's friend came out of the bathroom screaming, "It's a 
fucking man," the men violently wrestled Gwen to the ground and pulled off her clothing, 
revealing male genitals. See id. at 7. Burying Araujo, one defendant said that he was so an-
gry, "he could still kick her a couple of times." Michelle Locke, Araujo's Death Was Violent, 
Witness Says, CONTRA COSTA TIMES, Apr. 28, 2004, at 4. 
5 See Curtis, supra note 2. 
6 See Kelly St. John, Prosecutor Calls 3 Defendants Equally Guilty in Teen s Death, S.F. 
CHRoN.,June 2, 2004, at B5. 
7 See CAL. PENAL CODE § 192 (West 1999); see also St. John, supra note 6. 
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spotlight on the "trans panic" defense, a variation of the gay panic 
and homosexual advance defenses.s 
Gay panic and homosexual advance arguments attempt to miti-
gate punishment for murder by categorizing as manslaughter a killing 
precipitated by either a perceived sexual advance or the revelation or 
perception that another person is a homosexual.9 Traditionally, gay 
panic defenses used a diminished capacity argument, claiming that a 
defendant's latent homosexuality caused his violent reaction to a gay 
man's advance. lO In contrast, homosexual advance defenses typically 
take the form of heat of passion arguments. l1 A defendant invoking a 
trans panic defense utilizes a heat of passion framework, claiming that 
his violent acts were triggered by the revelation that another person, 
sometimes with whom he has been sexually involved, is transgen-
dered. 12 
Judges should decline to instruct juries on manslaughter when a 
trans panic defense is used because that defense does not fulfill the 
elements of a heat of passion claim.13 A close look at the defense as it 
was put forward in the first Aral~o trial proves that it never fulfills the 
8 See generally Christina Pei-Lin Chen, Note, Provocation's P1ivileged Desire: The Provocation 
Doct1ine, 'Homosexual Panic' and the Non-Violent Unwanted Sexual Advance Defense, 10 CORNELL 
J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 195 (2000) (offering a legal and historical background and critical 
analysis of homosexual panic and sexual advance defenses); Kelly St. John, Mistrial in 
Transgender Case, S.F. CHRoN.,June 23, 2004, at AI. 
9 See Chen, supra note 8, at 210. The author outlines the origins of the nonviolent ho-
mosexual advance defense and its shift from homosexual panic as an insanity defense to 
homosexual advance as a provocation defense. See id at 201-16. 
10 See Gary David Comstock, Dismantling the Homosexual Panic Defense, 2 L. & SEXUALITY 
81, 82 (1992), Kara S. Suffredini, P1ide alld Prejudice: The Homosexual Panic Defense, B.C. 
THIRD WORLD LJ. 279, 287-88 (2001). 
1\ Sec Robert B. Mison, Homophobia in Alanslaughter: The Homosexual A.dvallce as ]n-
sufficient Provocation, 80 CAL. L. REV., 133, 136-41 (1992). 
12 Sec Vicki Haddock, 'Cay Panic' Defense in Araujo Case, S.F. CHRON., May 16,2004, at 
EI. This Book Review defines "transgendered" (trans) as all gender nonconforming peo-
ple, including pre- and post-operative transsexual people, feminine men and masculine 
women, and intersexed people. Sec Jennifer L. Levi, Paving the Road: A Charles Hamilton 
Houston Approach to Securing Trans Rights, 7 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 5, 5 n.2 (2000). For 
a further description of transgender identity, its difference from and intersection with 
issues of sexuality, see Mary Coombs, Characteristics of Transgendcrislll, 8 UCLA WOMEN'S LJ. 
219,237-242 (1998). 
13 Sec People v. Cole, 95 P.3d 811, 850-51 (Cal. 2004); People v. Breverman, 960 P.2d 
1094, 1106-07 (Cal. 1998); Hate Crime Memo, supra note 2, at 11-13. A Wyoming judge 
made headlines with his decision to disallow an instruction based on a "gay panic" type of 
defense in the Matthew Shepard case. See Press Release, Human Rights Campaign, Judge 
Throws Out "Bla1lle the l'ictim" Defense, Nov. 1, 1999, available at http://www.hrc.org/Con-
tent/ContentGroups/News_Releases/1999/JUDGE_THROWS_OUT_BLAME_THE_VlC 
TIM_DEFENSE.htm. 
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legal elements ofa heat of passion claim.14 To understand why the two 
are incompatible, one must examine the emotion-based elements of 
heat of passion defenses alongside the pattern of facts put forward in 
a standard "trans panic" argument. 15 
Emotions were central to Aral~o's case, as defense counsel's heat 
of passion claim turned on the defendants' emotional reaction to dis-
covering that their friend Gwen-with whom three of them had been 
sexually in timate-had male genitals. 16 One lawyer explained that the 
men acted out of "shame and humiliation, shock and revulsion."17 
Feelings of having been duped grounded defendants' framing of the 
case as a "story about deception and betrayal. "18 
Such emotions have long played a central role in some areas of 
our legal tradition. In Hiding from Humanity, Martha Nussbaum exam-
ines that role, focusing on ways in which emotions reflect society's 
evaluation of what constitute important benefits and harms.t9 
Specifically, Nussbaum examines shame and disgust, and concludes 
that these emotions, central to the defense in Araujo's case, should 
not form the basis for legal defenses. 2o 
This Book Review explains why mitigation for trans panic de-
fenses is not legally justifiable, and concludes that courts should dis-
courage their use by refusing to instruct juries on manslaughter based 
on trans panic heat of passion arguments. 21 Part I scrutinizes Nuss-
baum's analysis of the structure of emotions and their place in mitiga-
tion doctrines. Part II uses Nussbaum's analysis to examine the com-
patibility of trans panic defenses with the elements of California's heat 
of passion defense. Part III explains why it is imperative that courts 
14 See Cole, 95 P.3d at 851; Breverman, 960 P.2d at l106-0i; Hate Crime Memo, supra note 
2, at 11-13. A heat of passion defense cannot be pieced together out of many insufficient 
elements; each element must be proved. See Brevermall, 960 P.2d at 1124 (Kennard, j., dis-
senting). 
15 See Breverman, 960 P.2d at 11 O(},Oi. 
16 See Hate Clause Memo, supra note 2, at i. This Book Review defines "defense counsel" 
as the two lawyers representing defendants who used a heat of passion argument to at-
tempt mitigation to manslaughter. 
17 Killer Acted Out of "Shame," GRAND RAPIDS PRESS, Apr. 16,2004, at A2. 
18 See Jamison Green, Seeking Justice for Gwen Araujo, PLANET OUT, at http://www. 
planetout.com/people/columns/green/archive/20040420.html (last visited Nov. 14, 
2004). 
19 See MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, HIDING FROM HUMANITY 22, 36 (2004). 
20 See id. at 13-15. 
21 See Cole, 95 P.3d at 850-51; Breverman, 960 P.2d at 1l0(},Oi; Commonwealth v. Carr, 
580 A.2d 1362, 1363-65 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990); Hate Crime Memo, supra note 2, at 11-13. 
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begin to curb legally deficient attempts to mitigate punishment in 
cases of violence against transgendered people. 
I. ARGUING EMOTION: THE LEGAL FUNCTION AND STRUCTURE OF 
EMOTIONS 
Nussbaum begins with the seemingly benign task of differentiat-
ing emotions from feelings. 22 Unlike "bodily forces" such as hunger, 
emotions necessarily incorporate beliefs.23 Strong emotions require a 
valuation of some object (usually related to one's own well-being) and 
a belief about that object.24 Anger, for example, involves a belief that 
an object one values has been harmed.25 Similarly, pity entails a belief 
that a person or an object that one cares about is suffering.26 
Nussbaum points out that because one person's feeling about an 
object may shift constantly and may differ from others' feelings, legal 
analysis rightly focuses judgments of reasonableness on the thoughts 
involved in emotion rather than the bare feelings. 27 Because beliefs 
underlie emotions, people's emotions shift when mistaken beliefs are 
exposed or when one changes his valuation of an object.28 Like an 
individual, a culture may judge the reasonableness of emotional reac-
tions differently over time.29 Nussbaum invites legal thinkers to con-
sider that the average man can be unreasonable, and that certain 
emotions are structurally and functionally prone to serving as reposi-
tories of man's unreasonableness.3o The role of these shifty emotions 
within the law should be scrutinized with skepticism.31 
Nussbaum's depiction of an emotion as a two-part entity, com-
prised of both an object and a valuation of that object, may seem a 
novel concept to many readers.32 In the doctrines of self-defense and 
22 See NUSSBAUM, supra note 19, at 24-31. 
23 [d. at 25-26. 
24 See id. at 27, 29. 
25 See id. at 27. 
26 See id. 
27 See NUSSBAUM, supra note 19, at 27-28. 
28 See id. at 34-35. For example, sexism-based hate and racism-based fear are not sim-
ply unreasoned urges; they can be overcome by new factual understandings of the actions 
of women and minorities. See id at 35. 
29 See id at 34-37. 
30 See id. at 36-37. 
31 See NUSSBAUM, supra note 19, at 36-37. 
32 See id. at 31. 
504 Boston College Third World Law Journal [Vol. 25:499 
mItIgation, however, legal doctrine recognizes and relies heavily on 
this two-pronged definition of emotion.33 Nussbaum explains: 
[I]n general we do not condone any homicide not commit-
ted in self-defense. We hold that the reasonable person 
would never actually take the law into his own hands in a 
situation of provocation. But we do want to give public and 
legal recognition to the fact that reasonable people become 
enraged at certain types of damages to themselves or their 
loved ones, and we therefore build into the legal doctrine a 
reduction for those who commit a violent act under such 
circumstances. The homicidal act is not justified, but it is 
partially excused, in the sense that a lesser punishment is 
given for it. The reason is not simply that the person's emo-
tion is comprehensible. It is that the emotion itself, though 
not the act chosen under its influence, is appropriate.34 
Significantly, even appropriate, intense emotion does not warrant 
mitigation unless that emotion is based on reasonable beliefs about a 
situation.35 
Thus, three emotion-based considerations aid evaluation of 
whether a given situation warrants mitigation: (1) does society value 
the object of the harm or threat to which the defendant reacted;36 (2) 
was the defendant's resulting emotion appropriate;37 and (3) was the 
defendant's reaction based on a reasonable belief about a situation?38 
Because these questions involve normative evaluations, they illustrate 
how "[t]he situations in which perpetrator emotion mitigates murder 
change inevitably with societal mores. "39 
Courts may use this three-step reasoning to examine the appro-
priateness of a manslaughter instruction in a given case. For example, 
1Il Commonwealth v. Can; a defendant argued for mitigation based on 
33 Sec id. at 37-45. 
34Id. at 39. 
35 Sec id. at 42-43. In California, it is well settled that passion alone cannot mitigate 
punishment: "no defendant may set up his own standard of conduct and justify or excuse 
himself because in fact his passions were aroused, unless ... the facts and circumstances 
were sufficient to arouse the passions of the ordinarily reasonable man." People v. Logan, 
164 P. 1121, 1122-23 (Cal. 1917). This Review focuses on California law, where Araujo's 
case took place. 
36 See NUSSBAUM, supra note 19, at 46-47. 
37 See id. at 36-37. 
38 See Logan, 164 P. at 1122-23; NUSSBAUM, supra note 19, at 42. 
39 See Megan Sullaway, Psychological Perspectives on Hate Crime Laws, 10 PSYCHOL. PUB. 
POL'y & L. 250, 269 (2004); see also NUSSBAUM, supra note 19, at 47. 
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disgust and revulsion when charged with shooting two lesbian women 
because he saw them being intimate with one another.40 The court 
rejected the heat of passion argument, stating, "[The law] does not 
recognize homosexual activity between two persons as legal provoca-
tion sufficient to reduce an unlawful killing ... from murder to volun-
tary manslaughter. "41 The court found that mitigation is inappropri-
ate when the defendant has reacted only to another person's sexuality 
or to a threat to his own sense of appropriate sexual behavior.42 Thus, 
the court's evaluation did not end with a finding that the defendant 
felt strong emotions; rather, the court looked to the content of those 
emotions-the threat he felt and the beliefs he held about his situa-
tion-to evaluate the reasonableness of his actions.43 The court stated 
that having witnessed the women's intimacy, a "reasonable person 
would simply have discontinued his observation and left the scene; he 
would not kill the lovers. "44 
Just as the Carr court held that homosexual activity is insufficient 
provocation, courts should find that the claimed provocation in trans 
panic defenses is insufficient as a matter oflaw. 45 Nussbaum's analysis of 
shame and disgust adds support to the conclusion that a trans panic 
defense, by definition, does not warrant instruction on manslaughter 
because its constituent parts do not satisfY the elements of heat of pas-
sion claims.46 Interestingly, although Nussbaum's book discusses sexual-
ity and gender dynamics within mitigation doctrine, it mentions nei-
ther trans panic defenses nor transgendered people in any contextY 
The omission is emblematic of the blind spot occupied by transgen-
dered individuals in our culture; even this scholar, whose work relates 
directly to the foundations of bias against the trans community, over-
40 See Commonwealth v. Carr, 580 A.2d 1362, 1363-64 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990). 
41 Id. at 1364-65. 
42 See id. 
43 See id.; see also NUSSBAUM, supra note 19, at 39-40. 
44 See Carr, 580 A.2d at 1364. 
45 See id. 
46 See People v. BreYerman, 960 P.2d 1094, 1106-07 (Cal. 1998); Hate C,ime Memo, supra 
note 2, at 11-13; NUSSBAUM, supra note 19, at 13-15. 
47 See NUSSBAUM, supra note 19, at 35,46-48,130-34. Nussbaum discusses at length the 
idea that being homosexual is insufficient provocation. See id. at 130-34. Similarly, she 
discusses and rejects the legitimacy of violence stemming from threats to one's masculinity. 
See id. at 35, 46-48, 298-99. Nowhere does Nussbaum introduce the concept of trans-
gender identity or the violence perpetrated against members of the transgender commu-
nity. See id. at 35, 46-48, 130-34, 298-99. 
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looked their implications for a population that desperately needs the 
benefit of her insights.48 
II. WHAT HAPPENS IN THE HEAT OF PASSION? 
Although jurisdictions differ as to the amount of evidence re-
quired to instruct on lesser included offenses, in California, a trial 
judge is only required to instruct the jury as to lesser included of-
fenses when there is substantial evidentiary support for those of-
fenses. 49 California courts define substantial evidence in this context 
as "evidence from which a jury composed of reasonable [persons] 
could ... conclude ... that the lesser offense, but not the greater, was 
committed."50 In a murder trial, to justify giving voluntary manslaugh-
ter instructions, there must be substantial evidence, not simply some 
evidence, of heat of passion.51 Further, because malice is presumed 
when circumstances of a killing suggest intent to kill, heat of passion 
and provocation must be affirmatively demonstrated.52 
California courts state that for an intentional, unlawful homicide 
to constitute voluntary manslaughter as a heat of passion crime, there 
must be substantial evidence of the following five elements: 1) that 
the killer's reason was actually obscured; 2) by a provocation; 3) which 
aroused a strong passion;53 4) sufficient to cause an ordinary person 
of average disposition to act rashly or without due deliberation and 
reflection; and 5) there must be insufficient time between provoca-
tion and fatal blow for passion to subside and reason to return.54 
48 Compare id., with Dylan Vade, No Issue of Sexual Deception, S.F. CHRON., May 30,2004, 
at E3 (connecting Araujo's fate to the larger issue of transphobia), and Patrick Letellier, 
2003 Exceeds Others in Transgender Killings, PLANET OUT, Nov. 26, 2003, at 
http://www.planetout.com/news/artic1e.htmI?2003/11/26/4 (detailing statistics of vio-
lence perpetrated upon members of the transgendered community). 
49 See People v. Cole, 95 P.3d 811, 850-51 (Cal. 2004); Brevcrman, 960 P.2d at 1106-07 
(Cal. 1998); People v. K;mawyer, 113 Cal. App.4th at 1233, 1245, 1247 (Cal. Ct. App. 
2003). 
50 See Breverlllan, 960 P.2d at 1106 (quoting Carr, 502 P.2d 513). In another case, the 
court found that the trial judge properly refused to instruct the jury on involunt;lry man-
slaughter because defendant was able to describe the crimes in detail and act in a cold, 
calculating manner during the crimes, so that no reasonable jury could have found defen-
dant guilty of involuntary manslaughter. People v. Haley, 96 P.3d 170, 190-91 (Cal. 2004). 
51 See People v. Williams, 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d 730, 734 (Cal. App. 2d 1995). 
52 See People v. Sedeno, 518 P.2d 913, 923 (Cal. 1974). 
53 ·Strong passion" is defined as any violent, intense, high-wrought or enthusiastic 
emotion other than revenge. See People v. Gutierrez, 28 Cal. 4th 1083, 1144 (Cal. 2002), 
ccrt. denied, 538 U.S. 1001 (2003). 
54 See Brevcrman, 960 P.2d at 1106. 
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The provocation, passion, and reasonableness requirements are 
linchpins of any heat of passion claim to mitigation.55 Sufficient provo-
cation ensures that the defendant's reaction was based on a reasonable 
belief about his situation.55 Requiring that the defense articulate a par-
ticular passion allows the factfinder to evaluate the appropriateness of 
the defendant's emotion.57 The reasonableness requirement invites an 
inquiry into how highly society values the type of harm or threat to 
which the defendant reacted.58 The Aral~o case, examined through 
Nussbaum's emotion analysis, illustrates that trans panic defenses do 
not fulfill these three elements of a heat of passion claim. 59 
A. Reaction to Inaction: Insufficient Provocation 
To warrant a heat of passion instruction, evidence must exist that 
the victim provoked the defendant; absent such evidence, a heat of 
passion instruction as to voluntary manslaughter is not justified.50 In 
California, the jury usually decides, as a question of fact, whether a 
particular provocation was sufficient to arouse an ordinarily reason-
able person's passion.51 However, the court may resolve the question 
where the provocation is sufficiently slight or sufficiently great.52 Al-
55 See NUSSBAUM, supra note 19, at 37-38. 
56 See id. at 42. 
57 See id. at 36-37. 
58 See id. at 46-47. 
59 See id. at 36-37,42,46-47. In Araujo's case, elements apart from these three are also 
lacking; serious doubts exist regarding the lack of a cooling off period. See Hate Clause 
Memo, supra note 2, at 8. At least one defendant dro\"e from the site of the attack to his 
house to get sho\"els for the assault, and drove back. See id; see also Without Mercy, supra note 
1. Prior to the attack, the men talked about what they might do to a "man who pretended 
to be a woman," creating doubt about a lack of premeditation or malice aforethought, 
which can be shown from either express evidence of deliberate purpose to kill or by infer-
ences made from other proof. See People v. Golsh, 219 P. 456, 457-58 (Cal. Ct. App. 1923); 
Hate Clause i\1.emo, supra note 2, at 5. 
60 See People v. Steele, 47 P.3d 225, 239 (Cal. 2002), ccrt. denied, 537 U.S. 1115 (2003). 
61 See People v. Valentine, 169 P.2d I, 11 (Cal. 1946); People v. Fenenbock, 46 Cal. 
App. 4th 1688, 1705 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996). 
62 See Fenenbock, 46 Cal. App. 4th at 1705. The court may decide the issue when reason-
able jurors could not differ on the issue of adequacy. See id. However, courts find some 
provocation insufficient as a matter of law without reference to the jury's consensus on its 
adequacy. See People v. Cole, 95 P.3d 811, 850-51 (Cal. 2004); Commonwealth v. Carr, 580 
A.2d 1362, 1364-65 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990). Therefore, the adequacy of the claimed provo-
cation should be evaluated as compared to other provocations which the courts have taken 
up and deemed sufficient or insufficient as a matter oflaw. See Cole, 95 P.3d at 850-51; Can; 
580 A.2d at 1364-65. 
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though no specific type of provocation is required, some types of 
provocation have been deemed insufficient as a matter oflaw.63 
As Nussbaum suggests, courts judging whether provocation is 
sufficient implicitly look for a threat or harm to some core value that 
is worthy of either protection or extreme reaction.64 Thus, typical ex-
amples of sufficient provocation include the murder of a family 
member, a threat to one's own life, or an intense quarre1.65 If no core 
value exists, provocation is insufficient, a situation found in People v. 
Fenenbock, where mitigation was denied when the defendant claimed 
that his panic was triggered by harm to a child with whom he had no 
close personal bond.66 
In Araujo's case, the defense did not explicitly define its claimed 
provocation, but implied three triggers: Aral~o's biological sex itself, 
the revelation of that sex, and Aral~o's act of "deception" arguably 
perpetuated on defendants.67 The first provocation claimed, Araujo's 
biological sex, does not constitute sufficient provocation. By 
definition, heat of passion requires first an action by the victim, fol-
lowed by defendant's violent reaction.68 When the victim is '~ust being 
there," and the defendant reacts to a feeling about that person (or 
even about himself), the defendant is the first aggressor.69 
To expand the definition of sufficient provocation to include a 
victim's characteristics would open the door to justifYing mitigation 
for murder of anyone that a killer merely dislikes, feels uncomfortable 
interacting with, or finds disgusting. 70 Nussbaum reminds readers that 
63 See Cole, 95 P.3d at 850-51; People v. K;mawyer, 113 Cal. App.4th at 1233 (Cal. 
App. 3d. 2003). 
64 See Fenenbock, 46 Cal. App. 4th at 1705; NUSSBAUM, supra note 19, at 46-47. In Cali-
forni.'l, verbal provocation may be sufficient, so provocation must not rest on its form, but 
with its effect on the defendant. See People v. Berry, 556 P.2d 777, 780 (Cal. 1976). 
65 Fenel/bock, 46 Cal. App. 4th at 1705. The court provides examples: "In previous cases, 
the murder of a family member, a sudden and violent quarrel, and infidelity of a wife or 
paramour have been held to constitute legally adequate provocation for voluntary man-
slaughter." Id. (citations omitted). "On the other hand, neither simple trespass nor simple 
assault constitute provocation sufficient to reduce the killing to manslaughter." Id. (cita-
tions omitted). 
66/d. 
67 See NUSSBAUM, supra note 19, at 128-29; Without Mercy, supra note 2, at 11-13 (ex-
plicitly arguing that "deceit" was the provocation, though using language implicitly sug-
gesting an array of possible triggers). 
68 See People v. Breverman, 960 P.2d 1094, 1106 (Cal. 1998); NUSSBAUM, supra note 19, 
at 39. 
69 See NUSSBAUM, supra note 19, at 128-29. 
70 See id. at 128-29, 133-34. Similarly, "[bleing disgusting to look at is not an invitation 
to violence," no matter how an aggressor reacts. Id. at 128. 
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disgust defenses in cases of violence against Jews, blacks, or people 
with disabilities are not entertained today, but were readily accepted 
in the past. 71 At times, our legal system and other governments have 
tolerated mitigation in the context of violence reacting to disability, 
religion or race.72 Today's tolerance of disgust defenses against gay 
and transgendered individuals highlights cultural anxiety around 
gender and sexuality boundary-crossing.73 Allowing the fact of being 
transgendered to qualifY as sufficient provocation reifies this anxiety.74 
Similarly, revealing one's biological sex does not constitute 
sufficient provocation.75 Again, California law states that to be 
sufficient, provocation must be caused by the victim.76 In Araujo's 
case, the defendants harassed Aral~o to determine her sex, ultimately 
throwing her to the ground and pulling off her clothing to reveal her 
genitals.77 Defense counsel suggested that the revelation had a par-
ticularly intense impact on these young men because they were imma-
ture and "unhealthy. "78 California case law, however, clearly disallows 
personal vulnerabilities or preexisting states of mind to bear on the 
evaluation of a person's reaction.79 For this reason, the prosecution 
71 See id. at 134. 
72 See id. at 107-115; see also Muneer 1. Ahmad, it Rage Shared by Law: Post-September 11 
Raciall'iolence as Crimes of Passion, 92 CAL. L. REV. 1259, 1265, 1301 (pointing out that "the 
claimed provocation of the "black rage" defense has been largely dismissed, and thereby 
rendered irrational," although "emotionally driven, racist policies" remain in place and 
actively inform our laws. 
73 SceNUSSBAUM, supra note 19, at 133-34. Again, though NUSSBAUM laments that "as a 
society, we are conflicted about the disgust issue as applied to homosexuals," she fails to 
mention those issues as applied to transgendered people. See id. at 134. Disgust aimed at 
transgendered people evidence society's current discomfort with challenges to policed 
gender boundaries. See Patience W. Crozier, Forcing Boys to be Boys, B.C. THIRD WORLD LJ. 
123,133-36 (2001). 
74 See NUSSBAUM, supra note 19, at 128-29. 
75 See People v. Lee, 971 P.2d 1001, 1007(Cal. 1999); NUSSBAUM, supra note 19, at 39-
40; Locke, Transgcnder l'vIurder, supra note 2. 
76 See Lee, 971 P.2d at 1007; Brcverman, 960 P.2d at 1106. Defendant's own thoughts 
triggered by another's action cannot constitute sufficient provocation because they are not 
acts of the victim. See People v. K;mawyer, 113 Cal. App. 4th at 1233, 1247 (Cal. App.3d. 
2003). 
77 See Hate Clause Memo, supra note 2, at 6-7. In the beginning of this encounter, the 
men made it clear that they were touching her to find out whether she was a man or a 
woman, she said of their unwanted physical touching and their comments, "I'm not going 
to let you molest me" and refused to answer their questions about her gender. See id. at 6. 
78 See Kelly St.John, Expert Backs 'Panic'Defense, S.F. CHRON., May 25, 2004, at Bl. 
79 See Logan, 164 P. at 1122. In another case of an unhealthy defendant, "evidence that 
he was intoxicated, that he suffered various mental deficiencies, that he had a psychologi-
cal dysfunction due to traumatic experiences in the Vietnam War, and that he just 
'snapped' ... may have satisfied the subjective element of heat of passion, but it did not 
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reminded jurors that the provocation "did not flow from Eddie 
Araujo. The provocation flowed from within [the defendants]. They 
were the source of their own provocation. "80 
Above all, defense counsel argued that Araujo's commission of 
"sexual fraud" constituted sufficient provocation.81 Rather than her 
transgender identity, the defense claimed that Araujo's "deception 
and betrayal," provoked the men's reaction.82 While burying Araujo, 
one defendant said that "he could not believe that someone could 
ever be so deceitful. By being deceitful, he meant having sex with 
someone who thought that it was a woman, not simply presenting as a 
woman when the person was actually a man."83 However, such "sexual 
fraud" also falls short of sufficiency. 
The inconsistent language used by reporters and attorneys to de-
scribe "sexual fraud" belies its lack of definition.54 Perhaps defense 
counsel intended the term to mean a wrongful act similar to so-called 
"heart balm" crimes: common law sexual torts including seduction, 
alienation of affections, and breach of promise to marry.85 California, 
however, abolished such "amatory torts" in 1939.86 More recently, the 
meaning of "sexual fraud" has shifted to encompass actions such as 
concealing a sexually transmitted disease or falsely stating that one is 
satisfy the objective, reasonable person requirement" because the victim must cause the 
provocation. See People v. Steele, 47 P.3d 225, 239 (Cal. 2002), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1115 
(2003). 
80 See Locke, Jury Ponders, supra note 2. 
81 See Locke, Defense Claims, supra note 2. 
82 See Haddock, supra note 12; see also Hate Clause Memo, supra note 2, at 6. 
85 See Hate Clause Memo, supra note 2, at 9. Much of the memo reveals a shocking disre-
spect of the victim and misunderstanding of her self-identity. See id. The memo uses the 
pronoun "it" to describe Araujo, and describes her as "actually a man," "a man who pre-
sented as a woman," and "acting as if he were a she." Id. The media also misrepresented 
Araujo's identity, with headlines such as Boy May Have Been Slain Duer Cross-Dressing, from 
SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Oct. 19,2002, available at http://www.mercurynews.com/mld/ 
mercurynews/news /4320907.htm?lc. 
84 See Locke, Defense Claims, supra note 2. Sometimes the phrase is used to mean the 
revelation of Araujo's gender, described above as insufficient provocation; one attorney 
said "the sudden discovery that she was biologically male was a sexual violation of the type 
'so deep, it's almost primal.'" See id. 
85 SeeAskewv. Askew, 28 Cal. Rptr. 2d 284, 290-91 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994) (citingJane E. 
Larson, Women Understand So Little, They Call My Good Nature Veceit, '93 COLUM. L. REV. 374, 
394, n.85 (1993». 
86 See CAL. CIV. CODE § 43.5 (West 1982). 
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taking birth control or is infertile.87 Yet, these claims too are rejected 
almost universally by courts on both policy and privacy grounds.88 
Fraud refers to a phenomenon wherein one misrepresents a ma-
terial fact that one has a duty to reveal; typically, the party alleging 
fraud must show that actual harm resulted. Of course, Araujo did not 
misrepresent her gender to the men; they knew her as a woman, and 
she both identified and lived as a woman.89 Nonetheless, defendants 
relen tlessly accused Araujo of "deception" and "sexual fraud. "90 
Though the defendants might not have known Araujo's biologi-
cal sex, fraud and deceit also require a person to misrepresent a fact 
that he or she has a duty to revea1.91 In fact, one defendant argued 
that the duty to reveal one's biological sex exists, stating, a "hetero-
sexual male has a right to ... choose the gender of his partners ... 
Eddie Araujo took away that choice by deception. ''92 
However, allowing this type of sexual fraud to constitute sufficient 
provocation leads inevitably to the conclusion that a person has a duty 
to reveal their genitals, or verbally communicate the nature of their 
biological sex to one with whom they are intimate.93 This creates both 
87 See Dan Subotnik, Sue Me, Sue Me, What Can You Do Mer [ Love You, 47 FLA. L. REV. 
311, 396, 398, 406 (1995) (presenting a thorough critique of sexual fraud, including a 
helpful questionnaire). 
88 See Hooper v. Moser, 2003 WI.. 22401283, at *2 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 22, 2003); see 
also Askew, 28 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 960-61. 
89 See Hate Clause MeT/to, supra note 2, at 3, 6; Without Mercy, supra note 1. 
90 See Hate Clause Afemo, supra note 2, at 6, 9. There is a so-called "sexual fraud statute" 
which is generally not applicable in trans panic defense cases, because it requires that sex 
was induced by fear. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 266c (West 2004). The statute was put into 
place after a case of extraordinary facts, not likely to be repeated. See Andy Grieser, Sex 
Under Duress, 2 A.B.A.]. E-REP. 9 (Feb. 7, 2003), available atwww.wesdaw.com. 
91 See Charpentier v. L.A. R.,ms Football Co., Inc., 89 Cal. Rptr. 2d 115, 123 (Cal. Ct. 
App.1999). 
92 See Kelly St. John, Nature of Killing Focus at End of Araujo Case, S.F. CHRON .. June I, 
2004. 
93 See Charpentier, 89 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 123. Transgendered people are popularly ex-
pected to reveal their sex, while others are not; trans advocates question this disparity. See 
V.,de, supra note 48. 
Mter being rejected by someone who claimed to have been deceived, V.,de 
wishes he had said: You deceived me. All this time I thought you were just a 
cute transgender guy. You really should have told me you are a nontransgen-
der person. I cannot believe that you did not tell me what your genitalia look 
like. I cannot go through with this. I would have never come over to your 
place had I known. 
[d. Of Araujo, he says: 
Gwen Araujo was being herself, openly and honestly. No, she did not wear a 
sign on her forehead that said "I am transgender, this is what my genitalia 
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a logistical conundrum (defining "sex" for the purposes of revelation) 
and serious policy concerns (determining when and how a person 
must reveal that "sex").94 California courts are reluctant to recognize 
fraud in situations that require an assessment of the parties' intimate 
relationship.95 In Stephen K. v. Roni L., the California appellate court 
rejected a misrepresentation claim based on plaintiff's reliance on his 
partner's false claim that she took birth control pillS.96 The court 
found: 
Claims such as those presented in this case arise from 
conduct so intensely private that the courts should not be 
asked to nor attempt to resolve such claims .... [A]lthough 
Roni may have lied and betrayed the personal confidence 
reposed in her by Stephen, the circumstances and the highly 
intimate nature of the relationship wherein the false repre-
sentations may have occurred, are such that a court should 
not define any standard of conduct therefor.97 
Courts should similarly refuse to suggest the existence of a duty to re-
veal one's genitals (or one's biological sex however defined).98 Such a 
revelation would also arise during "intensely private conduct" and in 
"highly intimate" circumstances.99 Barring the existence of a duty to 
reveal one's sex, courts should not base mitigation instructions on an 
imagined breach of this contrived duty.100 
A final element of fraud is a showing that actual damage re-
sulted. 101 Statutorily and logically, fraud without harm is not action-
able. 102 For example, one is not required to disclose one's birth con-
look like." But her killers didn't wear a sign on their foreheads saying, ·We 
might look like nice high school boys, but really, we are transphobic and are 
planning to kill you." That would have been a helpful disclosure. 
ld. 
94 SeeWoyv. Woy, 737 S.W.2d 769, 773-74 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987) (holding that a wife had 
no duty to reveal to her husband a lesbian relationship she engaged in before marriage). 
See gel/erally ANNE FAUSTO-STERLING, SEXING THE BODY: GENDER POLITICS AND THE CON-
STRUCTION OF SEXUALITY (2000) (detailing problems inherent in defining sex). 
95 See Stephen K. v. Roni L., 164 Cal. Rptr. 618, 619 (Cal. App. 2d 1980). 
96 See id. 
9; See id. at 619-20. 
98 See id. 
99 See id. 
100 See Way, 737 S.W.2d 769, 773-74 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987). 
101 See Lovejoyv. AT & T Corp., 14 Cal. Rptr. 3d 117,122,125 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004). 
102 See id.; see also Charpentier v. L.A. Rams Football Co., Inc, 89 Cal. Rptr. 2d 115, 123 
(Cal. Ct. App. 1999). 
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trol use or infertility, in part because courts are unwilling to recognize 
"wrongful birth" as harm for the purpose of proving fraud.103 In trans 
panic cases, the sole harms implicated by defendants' arguments are 
surprise and a destabilization of their sexual identity and masculin-
ity.I04 The Carr court found the defendant's heat of passion claim 
deficient, in part because Carr suffered no harm or threat beyond an 
affront to his ideas about sexuality.105 Similarly, a court should not 
identify as actual harm a threat to defendants' perception of their 
own sexuality by allowing "sexual fraud" to constitute sufficient provo-
cation. I06 
Even if a court does uphold a duty to reveal one's genitals, rec-
ognize the breach of that duty as sexual fraud, and find that a result-
ing consensual sexual encounter was actual harm, one must still ask 
whether such "sexual fraud" constitutes sufficient provocation.107 Per-
ceived "deceit" occurs in many intimate relationships; one person may 
lie about her age, another about his marital status. lOB The law does not 
recognize these types of deceit as paths to mitigating punishment for 
murder.l09 
B. I Second-Guess That Emotion 
To prove heat of passion under California law, sufficient provoca-
tion must arouse "any violent, intense, high-wrought or enthusiastic 
emotion."lIo However, a complete exception to this "any emotion" 
standard exists for revenge. lII The creation of this exception suggests 
103 See Barbara A. v.John G., 193 Cal. Rptr. 422, 429 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983); Stephen K. v. 
Roni L., 164 Cal. Rptr. 618, 620-21 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980). 
104 See Hate Clause Memo, supra note 2, at 7; Kelly St. John, Witness Tells How She Learned 
Transgender Teen Was Male, S.F. CHRON, Apr. 21, 2004 at B5; St. John, Panic Defense, supra 
note 79. 
105 See 580 A.2d at 1364-65. 
106 See id. 
107 See Lovejoy, 14 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 122, 125; Woy v. Woy, 737 S.w. 2d 769, 773-74 (Mo. 
Ct. App. 1987); Stephen K., 164 Cal. Rptr. at 619; Vade, supra note 48. 
108 See Subotnik, supra note 87, at 406; Haddock, supra note 12. 
\09 See Woy, 737 S.W. 2d at 773-74; Steplten K., 164 Cal. Rptr. at 619. One might also ask 
whether courts would entertain fraud claims based on the non-revelation of one's race, 
religion, disability, or ethnicity. See Michelle Locke, Activists Put A.raujo Case Under Close 
Watch, CONTRA COSTA TIMEs,June 7, 2004, at 4 (quoting Shannon Minter, legal director of 
the National Center for Lesbian Rights). 
110 See People v. Breverman, 960 P.2d 1094, 1106-07 (Cal. 1998) (citations omitted). 
111 See People v. Gutierrez, 52 P.3d 572, 609 (Cal. 2002), cert. denied, 538 U.S. 1001 
(2003); People v. Logan, 175 Cal. 45, 49 (1917); NUSSBAUM, supra note 19, at 13-15. Cali-
forni.'l courts are not explicit about why revenge constitutes an absolute exception, except 
to say that it is a deliberate, sometimes belated, emotion suggesting premeditated, rea-
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that a court might disqualify other emotions from comprising appro-
priate passions under heat of passion. Nussbaum's inquiry into disgust 
and shame suggests that another exception for these two emotions 
should exist in the context oftrans panic defenses. ll2 
To shore up the emotion requirement of its heat of passion 
claim, defense counsel relied heavily on a dramatic account of the 
night of AralUo's killing. 113 A motion detailed two defendants' imme-
diate reactions to the revelation of AralUo's biological sex, claiming 
that the "news provoked emotional reactions." 114 One defendant ap-
peared "disillusioned" and had a "look in his eyes ... like his illusion 
as to normality and the way things are supposed to be had been shat-
tered. "115 He acted as if he had heard "the craziest news you could 
ever hear."116 A second defendant cried, and "throughout all the 
even ts was very emotional. "117 While killing Araujo, he exclaimed, "I 
can't be fucking gay, 1 can't be fucking gay."l1B Defense counsel 
claimed that the men acted out of "shame and humiliation, shock and 
revulsion. "119 Reliance on shame and disgust is typical of trans panic 
defenses; Nussbaum, however, argues that these two emotions are 
merely signs of a legally deficient argument for heat of passion mitiga-
tion.l 20 
1. Disgust 
Nussbaum advances structural, historical, and experiential rea-
sons why disgust should never form the basis of law, especially in miti-
gation contexts. 121 "The ideational content of disgust is that the self 
soned punishmen t. See People v. Daniels, 802 P.2d 906. 932 (Cal. 1991). One might argue 
that the men in Araujo's case acted out of revenge; the men had suspicions that Araujo 
might have male genitalia, and talked extensively prior to her murder about what they 
might do to a man who "pretended to be a woman." Hate Clause !vIel//O, supra note 2, at 5; 
St. John, supra note 92. That prior conversation may indicate malice. Hate Clause Memo, 
supra note 2, at 5; St. John, supra note 92. Malice can be shown from either express evi-
dence of deliberate purpose to kill or by inferences made from other proof. See People v. 
Smith, 104 P.2d 510, 514 (Cal. 1940). 
112 See Gutierrez, 52 P.3d at 609; NUSSBAUM, supra note 19, at 13-15. 
113 See Hate Clause jIJemo, supra note 2, at 2-9; St.John, supra note 92. 
114 See Hate Clause !vIemo, supra note 2, at 7 (citations omitted). 
115 See id. 
116 See id. 
Il7 See id. 
118 See id. 
119 See Killer Acted Out of "Shame," supra note 17. 
120 See NUSSBAUM, supra note 19, at 13-15; Vade, supra note 48. 
121 See NUSSBAUM, supra note 19, at 13-15. Before reaching her conclusion, she 
survveys the spectrum of academic discourse regarding disgust, and situates her argument 
2005] "Trans Panic" Mitigation Claims 515 
will become base or contaminated" by ingesting offensive materiaI.I22 
In turn, a fear of contamination typically involves anxiety around 
some boundary violation or a violation of accepted categories.123 The 
defendants in AralUo's case made clear that their well-policed gender 
and sexuality boundaries were threatened, resulting in a feeling that 
"the way things are supposed to be had been shattered. "124 The de-
fendants' illusion that their gender and sexuality was impenetrable, 
stable, and immovable was challenged by AralUo's transgender iden-
tity.125 
Furthermore, social psychology links disgust to human beings' 
refusal to accept our own animal nature. 126 Professor William Miller 
states that "the basis for all disgust is us-that we live and die and that 
the process is a messy one emitting substances and odors that make us 
doubt ourselves and fear our neighbors. "127 Nussbaum explains that 
resistance to vulnerabilities often leads a powerful majority to project 
disgust onto minority groups in order to insulate itself from contami-
nation.128 
History, too, provides ample evidence that laws and behaviors 
resulting from a disgust justification are oppressive at best, torturous 
at worst.129 Over time, American society has propagated, and later re-
among these disparate voices. See id at 75-84. Authors of every political persuasion have 
weighed in, and many consider disgust an important means of identifying what is bad in 
society, and therefore what should be regulated. See. e.g., id. at 82. These authors differ 
greatly on why disgust is a reliable emotion around which to construct laws. See id. at 75-
84. Some claim that disgust illuminates social norms, while others argue that disgust func-
tions as a warning signal, pointing out what behavior may be destructive to our humanity. 
Compare id. at 78, with id. at 86 (presenting popular arguments on both sides of this de-
bate). 
122 NUSSBAUM, supra note 19, at 88. 
123 See id. at 93-94. 
124 See Hate Clause Memo, supra note 2, at 7; Kelly St.John, Witness Tells How She Learned 
Transgender Teen was Alalc, S.F. CHRON., Apr. 21, 2004 at B5; St.John, supra note 78. 
125 Sec Hate Clause Alelno, supra note 2, at 7; Kelly St. John, Witness Tells How She Learned 
Transgender Teen was Alale, S.F. CHRON., Apr. 21, 2004 at B5; St.John, supra note 78. 
126 Sec NUSSBAUM, supra note 19, at 89. 
127 WILLIAM I. MILLER, THE ANATOMY OF DISGUST xiv (1997). 
128 Sec NUSSBAUM, supra note 19, at 97. Nussbaum reminds us that as early as elemen-
tary school, we learned to create a hierarchy on the playground by attributing "cooties," 
often perceived as little bugs, to the kids we didn't let into the popular group. Sec id. Sec 
generally Ahmad, supra note 72 (placing racial violence in the framework of heat of passion 
defenses and the normalization of racially-based violence through irrational national poli-
cies) . 
129 See id. at 101-02. Nussbaum painstakingly describes many vivid examples of this 
phenomenon, including Nazi portrayal of Jews as slimy, disgusting parasites infesting the 
"clean body" of the German machine-like ideal, and an effort by an anti-gay referendum 
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pudiated, laws that project disgust onto disfavored minorities, includ-
ing Jews, African Americans, women, and gay men.130 Mitigation in 
trans panic defenses cases amounts to an acceptance of violence 
against transgendered people founded in disgust.131 Thus, with negli-
gible representation and protection in our legal system, transgen-
dered people find disgust for them reified in the law.132 
Nussbaum also discredits disgust because it has no place in laws 
in tended to engender shared and articulable values, such as mitiga-
tion.133 It is almost impossible to convince someone who is not dis-
gusted by something that that thing is, in fact, disgusting. 134 One 
might discuss the properties of the offensive object, or attempt to as-
similate it with an object that your listener already finds disgusting, 
but one is likely to fail in this effort.135 By contrast, anger and indigna-
tion are emotions that can be easily brought out in one person by an-
other, in part because values underlying these emotions can be shared 
and fully communicated.136 Where articulable values exist, a society 
can promulgate laws based on an acceptance or rejection of those 
values; where emotions indicate only one person's unique self-
reflection or biases, we may be more wary of basing laws on those 
emotions.137 
Lastly, according to Nussbaum, disgust is suspect because it is 
based on "magical thinking" rather than wrongdoing.138 It does not re-
spond to changing amounts of risk, and does not correlate to real 
sources of harm.139 Instead, the feared harm giving rise to disgust is 
campaign to convince people that gay men eat feces and drink blood. See id. at 107-15, 
150. 
130 See id. at 134. Nussbaum points out that laws restricting private, consensual homo-
sexual activities are based on disgust rather than actual harm. See id. at 148-151. Compare 
Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (upholding the constitutionality of a Georgia 
statute outlawing sodomy), with Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (overturning that 
decision). 
m See Hate Crime Memo, supra note 2, at 7; NUSSBAUM, supra note 19, at 88; Haddock, 
supra note 12; St.John, supra note 78. 
132 See Hate Crime J.felllo, supra note 2, at 7; NUSSBAUM, supra note 19, at 88; Haddock, 
supra note 12; St.John, supra note 78. 
133 See NUSSBAUM, supra note 19, at 39, 101. 
134 See id. 
135 See id. Similarly, one may describe to a friend the erotic love felt for a partner with-
out being able to convince that friend to love the partner in the same way. See id. 
136 See id. 
137 See id. at 102-03, 122. 
138 See NUSSBAUM, supra note 19, at 102-03, 122. 
139 See id. at 102. 
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imagined.140 Such logic, based on irrational fears of contamination and 
constructive, not actual, harm is at best a shaky foundation on which to 
base a claim for mitigation. 141 The "harm" to the defendants in i\ralUo's 
case is an imagined wrong. 142 Their comments during and after the 
crime, such as "I can't be ... gay," illustrate that the primary perceived 
threat was one to their sexuality.143 Mitigation typically addresses a vio-
lent reaction to concrete harm or threat, whereas disgust reveals a 
sense that an act, object, or person is a pollutant, and "[w]e would be 
better off if this contamination were kept far away from us. "144 
2. Shame 
In the Aral~o case, a psychologist testifYing for the defense ex-
plained that an "unhealthy" young man is likely to panic when con-
fronted with the personal and public shame of learning about a sex-
ual partner's transgender identity.145 However, the defendants' 
claimed "shame and humiliation" should not constitute qualifYing 
emotions for the purpose of heat of passion.146 Shame is closely con-
nected to a vain wish for omnipotence and an unwillingness to accept 
one's neediness,147 Like disgust, shame reflects both a desire to hide 
from imperfections and a wish to be perfect, whole, and impenetra-
ble.148 Gay men's sexuality, for example, may threaten an insecure 
straigh t man's fan tasy of impenetrability and immovable heterosexual-
140 See id. 
141 See id. at 102-03. John Stuart Mill wrote: 
[W]ith regard to the merely contingent, or ... constructive injury which a 
person causes to society, by conduct which neither violates any specific duty to 
the public, nor occasions perceptible hurt to any assignable individual ... the 
inconvenience is one which society can afford to bear, for the sake of the 
greater good of human freedom ... [T] here are many who consider as an in-
jury to themselves any conduct which they have a distaste for, and resent it as 
an au trage to their feelings. 
JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 80-81 (Elizabeth Rapaport ed., Hackett Pub. Co., 5th 
prtg. 1978) (1859). Such outrage alone cannot justify regulation of the inadvertently of-
fending conduct. See id. 
17. 
142 See NUSSBAUM, supra note 19, at 102. 
143 See St. John, supra note 79; Hate Clause Memo, supra note 2, at 7. 
144 See NUSSBAUM, supra note 19, at 122-23. 
145 See St. John, supra note 79. 
146See NUSSBAUM, supra, note 19, at 36-37, 129; Killer A.cted Out of "Shame," supra note 
147 See NUSSBAUM, supra note 19, at 15. 
148 See id. at 17, 184-85. 
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ity.149 Laws should not sanction "[heterosexual] male loathing of the 
male homosexual," a loathing that too often presents itself through 
violence.150 
Perhaps most importantly, both shame and disgust react to a 
whole person or a characteristic rather than a discrete action. l5l To 
the extent that one's dislike of another person is related to a Vldner-
ability in his own personality or identity, it is illogical and unfair to 
mitigate punishment for his violent acts towards that other person}52 
Mitigation is most appropriately understood as a way for judges and 
juries to partially forgive a person's violent reaction to a harmful or 
threatening action; it should not be a means of lessening punishment 
based on a reaction to one's own or another's character}53 Insofar as 
shame and disgust reflect a person's wishes for perfection, impene-
trability, stable gender boundaries, or unchanging sexual orientation, 
shame and disgust reactions amount to a portrait of the bias of a par-
ticular day.154 
C. A Few Unl'easonable Men 
Trans panic defenses likewise fail to fulfill a third heat of passion 
element: reasonableness. Heat of passion claims require that the 
claimed provocation be sufficient to cause an ordinary person of av-
erage disposition to act rashly or without due deliberation and 
reflection.155 A defendant may not generate his own standard of con-
duct to justify his actions unless the jury also finds that the facts and 
circumstances were sufficien t to arouse the passions of an ordinarily 
reasonable man}56 Defense counsel in Araujo's case simply ignored 
149 See id. at 113-14. 
150 See id. Nussbaum calls heterosexual male loathing of the male homosexual the 
"central locus of disgust" in contemporary American culture. See id. at 13. 
151 See Commonwealth v. Carr, 580 A.2d 1362, 1364-65 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990); Nuss-
BAUM, supra note 19, at 106, 229. 
152 See NUSSBAUM, supra note 19, at 128-29. 
153 See id. at 39, 128-29. 
154 See id. at 13-17, 93-94, 184-85. 
155 See People v. Breverm:m, 960 P.2d 1094, 1106 (Cal. 1998); People v. Berry, 556 P.2d 
777,781 (Cal. 1976). 
156 See People v. Logan, 164 P. 1121, 1122 (Cal. 1917). "Thus no man of extremely vio-
lent passion could so justify or excuse himself if the exciting cause be not adequate, nor 
could an excessively cowardly man justify himself unless the circumstances were such as to 
arouse the fears of the ordinarily courageous man." Id. 
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this rule when they argued that the defendants' emotional immaturity 
exacerbated their reaction. 157 
The reasonableness element of the heat of passion doctrine in-
vites an inquiry into whether the value threatened or harmed by a 
particular provocation is one to which society expects a reasonable 
person to react violently.l58 In trans panic defense cases, one must 
therefore ask whether a threat to one's sexuality reasonably triggers 
an aggressive reaction. 159 Many reject the idea that a homicidal reac-
tion to a challenge to an individual's sexuality is a reasonable one; the 
reasonableness requirement of heat of passion claims allows a court to 
consider just that. 160 
Nussbaum points out that over time, the law has shifted as to 
which core values may justifiably be protected by mitigation doc-
trines. 161 For example, until the late 1970s, the law generally held that 
marital infidelity could provoke a reasonable man to homicidal rage; 
mitigation in this scenario protected a sense of "manly honor. "162 To-
day, although most people judge infidelity as morally wrong, and 
something that a reasonable man would be angry about, few would 
condone a homicidal reaction. 163 This expresses a societal shift away 
from accepting a violent reaction to the wrongful "taking" of one's 
wife.164 The honor or ownership threatened by infidelity is no longer 
157 See id; see also Yomi S. Wronge, Judge Declares Mistrial ill Araujo 1VIurder Case, CONTRA 
COSTA TIMES, June 23, 2004, at 4. E\'en a defense witness psychologist testified that a "male 
who is more mature" than the defendants would know that to "go for a walk or eyen to hit 
the wall could be a more appropriate response," St. John, supra note 78. Recall also that 
the judge in Carr suggests that a reasonable person would have "left the scene" if upset 
about same-sex intimacy, See 580 A.2d 1362, 1364 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990). 
158 See Brevennan, 19 Cal. 4th at 163; NUSSBAUM, supra note 19, at 43. 
159 See Breverman, 19 Cal. 4th at 163; NUSSBAUM, supra note 19, at 43. 
160 See NUSSBAUM, supra note 19, at 132. See genemlly Mison, supra note 11 (assessing the 
reasonable requirement as it pertains to homosexual provocation defenses). 
161 See NUSSBAUM, supm note 19, at 46-47. 
162 See id. at 46-47, 63. "''''hen wives were legally the property of their husbands, con-
temporary law allowed that 'adultery is the highest inyasion of property' and therefore 'if 
the husband shall stab the adulterer ... this is bare manslaughter' (not murder)." See Sul-
laway, supm note 39, at 269 (quotingJ]. Sing, Culture as Sameness: Toward a Synthetic View of 
Provocation and Culture ill the Climillal Law, 108 YALE L.J. 1845-84 (1999)). 
163 See NUSSBAUM, supra note 19, at 47. 
164 See id. In California, mitigation is still allowed when there is sufficient evidence of a 
continuous pattern of provocative conduct by the victim during the course of a romantic 
relationship which culminates in a passionate outburst; however, mere "sexual jealousy" 
will not fulfill the sufficient provocation requirement of heat of a passion defense. See Peo-
pleY. Borchers, 325 P.2d 97,102 (Cal. 1958). In 1994, picketing, editorializing, and judicial 
disciplinary proceedings followed an adultery case in which the judgt> allowed voluntary 
manslaughter, commenting that nothing could proyoke an "uncontrollable rage" greater 
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unanimously understood to comprise a core value that society deems 
worthy of protection by mitigation doctrines. 165 
Defendants arguing trans panic defenses point to their hetero-
sexuality and masculinity as the core values threatened by the vic-
tim,166 Shouting "I can't be fucking gay, I can't be fucking gay ... " as 
he killed Araujo, one man put words to his deep homophobia, and 
the fear that his sexuality might be other than he believed,167 One de-
fendant tellingly said that his "illusion as to normality and the way 
things are supposed to be had been shattered. "168 To comfort another 
defendant, the woman who discovered Araujo's biological sex ap-
pealed directly to his masculinity, saying "[T]his is not your fault. You 
were a football player."169 Araujo's identity shook the men's fragile 
confidence in their masculinity and sexuality, thereby shaking their 
entire world viewPo 
To define sexuality or masculinity as core values to which a rea-
sonable person might react with extreme violence is a dangerous 
proposition. l7l A court endorses this valuation of sexuality and mascu-
linity when it instructs a jury on manslaughter based on defendants' 
violent reaction to a threat to their identity, as opposed to their life, 
physical well-being, or family.172 Given that shame and disgust are 
typically repositories of unreasonableness, the court should consider 
the reasonable man standard for heat of passion not in terms of the 
average man reacting to these emotions, but the rational man-for 
than adultery, and that not many men "would have the strength to walk away without 
inflicting some corporal punishment." See NUSSBAUM, supra note 19, at 46. The public 
outcry exemplifies a societal rejection of adultery heat of passion defenses. See id. 
165 See NUSSBAUM, supra note 19, at 63. 
166 See Hate Clause Memo, supra note 2, at 7; St.John, supra note 92. 
167 See Hate Clause klemo, supra note 2, at 7. He also said, "I'm not gay. I don't like men." 
St.John, supra note 104. Again, the men's ignorance about transgender identity was key to 
their understanding of the situation. See Vade, supra note 48. Araujo identified as a woman, 
and one's understanding of one's sexuality may change over time; only defendant's narrow 
view of gender and sexuality allowed him to believe that intimacy with her implied that he 
was gay. See id. 
168 See Hate Clause Memo, supra note 2, at 7. 
169 See St. John, supra note 106. 
170 See id.; see also Hate Clause MC7no, supra note 2, at 7. 
m See Mison, supra note 11, at 159-61. 
172 See NUSSBAUM, supra note 19, at 127; Mison, supra note 11, at 159-61. Nussbaum 
explains that though the standard for sufficient provocation shifts over time, it "always 
involves some serious aggression and harm done to the defendant by the victim," such as 
bodily assault or domestic abuse. See NUSSBAUM, supra note 19, at 127. 
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whom it is unreasonable to react violently to a threat to his sexual-
ity.173 
III. A PASSIONATE ApPEAL FOR JUSTICE 
One defense attorney in Araujo's case explicitly asked .iurors not 
to think of their verdict as a message to society,l74 Yet, the trans panic 
defense inevitably reifies harmful stereotypes about transgendered 
individuals,l75 The defense bolsters a common myth that transgen-
dered people are deceiving the world about their true self, rather 
than struggling to understand and communicate their identity in a 
safe environment,I76Just as harmful a message, trans panic communi-
cates the idea that one may protect one's masculinity or perception of 
his or her sexuality at all costs.177 
Sadly, trans panic defenses do resonate with .iuries that harbor 
biases, misinformation, or confusion about transgendered individu-
als. 178 In 1998, a Boston jury acquitted William Palmer of murder and 
manslaughter,l79 Palmer had picked up a woman named Chanelle 
Pickett in a bar, and when he found out that she had male genitals, he 
beat and throttled her for more than eight minutes, ultimately killing 
173 See Commonwealth v. Carr, 580 A.2d 1362, 1364 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990); NUSSBAUM, 
supra note 19, at 36. 
174 Kelly St. John, Prosecutor Calls 3 Defendants Equally Guilty in Teen's Death, S.F. CHRON., 
June 2, 2004, at B5. Another asked female jurors to put themselves in a "different 
mindset," and think about how their sons or nephews might have reacted. L.A. Chung, In 
Transgendcr Case, Don't Ask Jurors to Think Like Defendants, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, June 4, 
2004, at C2. Chung wholly rejects this suggestion, saying: 
See id. 
In an era when we try 14-year-olds for murder and expect them to know right 
from wrong like adults, [women] are now asked to think like 24-year-old men 
who are in a state of arrested emotional developmen t. So should I give a pass 
to men for just acting like boys? From this woman's point of view: Don't insult 
me. 
175 See Press Advisory, 5 Facts Missing from Discussions Abollt the Murder of Gwen Araujo, 
TRANSGENDER LAW CENTER (May 17, 2004), at http://www.transgenderlawcenter.org 
[hereinafter 5 Facts]. 
176 See Vade, supra note 48; 5 Facts, supra note 175. 
177 See Chen, supra note 8, at 225. Some activists note that if women were allowed to re-
act with violence to unwanted sexual advances by heterosexual men the way "gay panic" 
allows straight men to react to gay men, "the world would have far fewer heterosexual 
men." Haddock, supra note 12; see also Mison, supra note 11, at 160-61. 
178 See Haddock, supra note 12. 
179 See id. 
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her.180 When Pickett was sentenced to just two years for assault and 
battery, one transgender activist said: "I've seen people get more jail 
time for abusing animals ... we've been judged expendable."181 
Such a tragic story of the trans panic defense "successfully" ex-
ploiting a transphobia arguably present in every jury today illuminates 
perhaps the strongest argument against the use of trans panic de-
fenses. The "average" man today may feel uncomfortable or unfamil-
iar with the issues faced by transgendered individuals; for this reason 
the court should not confuse him with the reasonable man.182 Nuss-
baum's rejection of disgust and shame as bases for mitigation goes to 
another central reason why trans panic mitigation attempts should 
fail: when emotions communicate an individual's own unique discom-
forts, vulnerabilities, and judgments about other people, they are not 
justifiable bases for law.183 
It is not surprising that Nussbaum fails to address the trans panic 
defense, given that transgendered people occupy a near-total blind 
spot in our society and legal system.184 Only a handful of states statu-
torily and expressly prohibit discrimination against transgendered 
individuals. 185 In only three states have courts interpreted Title VII sex 
discrimination to include transgendered people.186 Public and private 
employers are free to discriminate against trans individuals in the vast 
majority of states.187 This bleak legal and legislative reality for the 
180 See id.; see also Kevin Rothstein, Travesty of justice: When Is a Murder Not a jHurder? 
When the Victim Is Transsexual, BOSTON PHOENIX, May 1997, available at http://www.bos-
tonphoenix.com/archive/linl0/97/05/MURDER.html. 
181 See Haddock, supra note 12. 
182 See id. (explaining that few jurors will know someone personally who is transgender, 
which is likely to work in favor of panic defenses in this context); see also NUSSBAUM, supra 
note 19, at 133-34. 
183 See NUSSBAUM, supra note 19, at 101-03, 229. 
184 Compare id. at 35,46-48,130-34,298-99 (discussing the implicaitons of gender and 
sexuality dynamics in mitigation and other law), with Vade, supra note 48 (highlighting the 
prevalence and implications of violence against trangendered people), and Letellier, supra 
note 49 (same). 
185 See U.S. jurisdictions with Laws Prohibiting Discrimination on the Basis of Gender Identity 
Or Expression, TRANSGENDER LAW & POLICY INSTITUTE, available at http://www. 
transgenderlaw.org/ ndlaws/index.htm (last visited Jan. 26, 2005) [hereinafter U.S. jurisdic-
tions]. 
186 See id. The states are Massachusetts, New Jersey, and New York. The Court of Ap-
peals for the Si.xth Circuit originally held the same, but later amended its decision to nar-
row its holding. See Smith v. City of Salem, 378 F.3d 566 (6th Cir. 2004); U.S. jurisdictions, 
supra note 185. 
187 See The State of the Workplace for Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transge/lder Americans 2003, 
HUMAN RIGHTS CAMPAIGN FOUNDATION 33-37 (2004), available at http://www.hrc.org/ 
Con ten t/Con ten tGrou ps/Publicationsl /State_oCthe_ Workplace/SOTW _03.pdf. 
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trans community reflects and reinforces a general lack of safety: tragic 
statistics of violence against transgendered people prove a dire need 
to address transphobia through both public education and protective 
laws. 188 The trans panic defense hinders all attempts at .iustice for 
trans individuals, as it institutionalizes misunderstanding and bias 
against them even in the context of brutal victimization. 
CONCLUSION: MANSLAUGHTER, MEET MISTRIAL 
The .iury in Araujo's case deadlocked, and a retrial is sched-
uled. 189 Post-deliberation interviews suggest that the jury may have 
rejected the trans panic defense, but was reportedly unable to choose 
between first- and second-degree murder. 190 Yet, the facts and circum-
stances of Araujo's case illustrate the urgent need for judges to disal-
low further use of trans panic defenses. 191 
The dignity of the court-as well as the individual parties-is at 
stake in the decision to reject trans panic defenses. As shown in this 
Book Review, trans panic arguments leave at least three elements of 
heat of passion defense unfulfilled. V\'hen basic elements of a defense 
lack the required substantial evidence, it follows that the court should 
protect bothjudicial resources and the integrity of the proceedings by 
declining to entertain the defense or base instructions on it. 192 When 
the court entertains a manslaughter instruction based on trans panic 
reasoning, it tolerates a claim that is legally without merit, while fuel-
ing a type of victim-blaming too familiar to the gay, lesbian, bisexual, 
and transgender communities.193 
188 See Letellier, supra note 48; Mick Meenan, Marine Kills Trans Prostitute in L.A., GAY 
CITY NEWS, Dec. 30, 2004, at http://www.gaycitynews.com/gcn_353/marinekillstrans. 
html; Remembering OUT Dead, GENDER.ORG, at http://www.gender.org/remember/ 
index.html (last visited Jan. 25, 2005). 
189 Sue Hutchison, Deadlocked Jury Sent a Alessage of Hope, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, 
June 29, 2004, at AEl; Kelly St. John, Mistrial ill Transgendcr Casc, S.F. CHRON., June 23, 
2004, at AI; Press Release, HRC StrongZv Disappointed and Saddcned at Araujo Mistrial, HUMAN 
RIGHTS CAMPAIGN FOUNDATION, June 22, 2004, available at http://v.'WW.hrc.org/Con 
tent/ContentGroups/News_Releases/20042/HRC_Strongly_Disappointed_and_Saddened 
_at_Araujo_Mistrial.htm. For updates about the status of the case, see the website of the 
Transgender Law Center, at http://www.transgenderlawcenter.org. 
190 Hutchison, supra note 189;Josh Richman, Panel Didn't Buy Defense 'Gay Panic' Algu-
ment, OAKLAND TRIB., June 23, 2004, available at 2004 WL 79862309. 
191 People v. Breverman, 960 P.2d 1094, 1106-07 (Cal. 1998); NUSSBAUM, supra note 19, 
at 13-15; Locke, supra note 109. 
192 See People v. Cole, 95 P.3d 811, 850-51 (Cal. 2004); People v. Kmawyer, 113 Cal. 
App. 4th at 1233,1245-47 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003). 
193 See Ben Aguirre Jr., Fundamentalists C011le from Kallsas to Protest Araujo trial, OAKLAND 
TRIB., Apr. 18, 2004, available at 2004 WL 73090553. Members of a fundamentalist church 
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Trans panic claims focus unwarranted scrutiny on the victim's 
character and lifestyle, which may both traumatize the victim's family 
and distract jurors from their duty tojudge the defendants' actions. 194 
Whether or not a trans panic defense succeeds, judicial and media 
attention given to the argument plays a dynamic role in the legal sys-
tem and the court of public opinion.195 The rejection of this legally 
unviable argument will be one step toward justice and dignity for 
Araujo, and for the trans community's many victims.196 
protested Araujo's trial and regretted passing up a chance to disrupt her funeral. See id. 
The church believes that Araujo, and "fags and fag-enablers" are to blame for any harm 
that comes to them. See WBC to Picket Funeral of Cross-Dressing Teen Pervert Eddie Araujo, 
GODHATESAMERICA.COM, Oct. 21, 2002, at http://www.godhatesamerica.com/ghfmir/ 
f1ers/ f1ierarch ive.h tml. 
194 See Commonwealth v. Carr, 580 A.2d 1362, 1363-65 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990); Brever-
man, 19 Cal.4th at 163; see also Hutchison, supra note 189. Araujo's mother lamented that 
"[elveryone is focusing on [Gwen'sllifestyle and not the murder ... It's not a lesbian, it's 
not a gay thing. It was his life, and life was hard for him." Jeremiah Hall, Remembering Gwen, 
ADVOCATE, Nov. 22, 2002, available at http://www.advocate.com/html/stories/877 / 
877 _araujo.asp. 
195 See NUSSBAUM, supra note 19, at 12. 
196 See Letellier, supra note 48; Public Announcement, ThTee Things to Do Coming Out of 
the Gwen Araujo Mistrial, TRANSGENDER LAW CENTER (June 23, 2004). 
